The Running of The Tide
From time to time I get into debates with young White Nationalists about the proper role of anger in our movement. Often, I argue that White Nationalism is inevitable and anger irrelevant.
Its exact shape is far from inevitable, but movement toward explicit race-conscious political organization of America is well underway. It just isn't that visible yet to young White males.
As I was cleaning up from a recent move, I stumbled upon a classic 1979 Wall Street Journal Article written by Ray Vicker.
For years following 1972 (the year I first subscribed to the Journal) column 3 on page 1 had daily short summaries of the armed conflicts de jour from around the World. Always, one party would be described as "leftist guerrillas" and the other party as "rightists."
Back then, the news was always interpreted in light of the struggle between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.
But around the time the article below appeared, something began to change, much as Don Quixote's perception of his love, Dulcinea, evolves from "doncella" (lady) into "puti-doncella" (whore-lady). Dulcinea was, of course, a prostitute by profession from the beginning.
To my young hot-head friends, I would suggest that the article below is extraordinarily important for assessing the probability of a geographic and political expression of White Nationalism here in the soon-to-be former U.S.
In 1979, Vicker was confronted with ambiguity that prevents him from characterizing the Ayatollah and his followers as leftists.
"There is pride in a victory which is seen as a definite Islamic coup (even though left-wingers in Iran may be in the background ready to seize control should Islamic leaders falter)."
But then, if these Shiites were not fighting for ideological reasons (leftism) then why were they fighting?
A Shiite businessman tells the author exactly what sentiments are behind the Shiite revolution in Iran with an analogy that an American of that period could not possibly fail to grasp.
"Don't misinterpret developments here, though. Right now the demonstrations you have been watching are more a sign of pride in Islam rather than an expression of newly aroused religious feeling. Maybe the arousal will come later. Now it is the same pride American blacks had when they realized they didn't have to hang their heads in shame for some imagined weakness in their character."
In other words, it is a racial-nationalist thing.
But notice Vicker's sensitivity to the middle class sensibilities of his readers. He does not come right out and say that this rebellion was motivated by racial feeling. Rather, he just quotes the Shiite businessman to suggest this as a hypothesis.
The principle point of the story is that Shiites stir anxieties in the capitals of each Arab country into which they immigrate. Now Mr. Vicker is certainly aware that Iranians are Indo- Europeans and that Arabs are semitics. Thus, not only is there a sectarian or doctrinal religious difference, but also a significant racial difference between the Shiites and the Arab populations in the countries of their diaspora.
Vickers ignored this racial history in 1979.
The reason is simple. Socialism de-racinates conflict!
Socialism provided intellectuals and elites of the West a faith that explained conflict as arising out of economic inequality, a condition that their new "industrial revolution" could make go away. According to the socialist faith, conflict would disappear with rising prosperity.
This aspect of socialism was invented not by Jews but by the English. Every thirty years a new generation of Celts would storm out of the hills of Scotland and fight a new war with the germanic tribes to the south. Occasionally, as in the case of Cromwell's roundheads, descendants of the Danish invaders of Northern and Eastern England would rise up and fight as well. According to Palmer & Colton's "A History of the Modern World" in 1600, only about four million people in England and lowland Scotland spoke English.
In response to these horrific tribal conflicts among whites, there developed in England not so much an ideology, but a set of manners to prevent conflict. The etiquette demanded that tribal differences be ignored by all in the hopes that the wars would stop.
Similar systems of etiquette evolved in Continental Europe in response to the Hundred Years war and the Thirty Years War. While the history books describe these wars as fights over religious dogma, the combatants were in fact different tribes of European Whites.
Indeed, blaming conflict on religious doctrine became, perhaps, the earliest universally accepted propaganda device of Western Civilization. Religions are mutable and voluntary. It is much more convenient to blame conflict on a mutable characteristic than the immutable one of ethnic origin.
Besides, ethnic or tribal identity was often expressed by religion. It is at least possible, following an ugly and destructive war, to shame people into taking their religion less seriously as a means of making them take their ethnic origins less seriously. Attacking their feelings of ethnic identity directly leads only to more bloodbaths.
Religion has been under attack in the West for 300 years as a means of weakening White tribal identities (See "No Offense: Civil Religion and Protestant Taste", by John Murray Cuddihy).
But the attacks on religion are a side-issue. Much more important is the enforced silence about ethnic identity. Our own Civil War was fought between Celtic Scots who migrated to the American South, and the newly arrived Germanic British in the industrial towns of the northeast. Yet you will look in vain for any mention of this ethnic difference in any of the newspapers, books or even private letters from soldiers of that day.
It is only the "Southrons" laboring at American Renaissance Magazine 130 years later who feel comfortable addressing this issue.
In large part, it was a breach of manners that made Hitler blunder into an unwanted fight with Britain and America in World War II. He committed the unforgivable sin of dredging up German ethnic identity (as opposed to European or White racial identity) as the organizing principle for the Third Reich. The middle classes in Britain and the U.S. were horrified. They needed no convincing.
While Hitler and his staff read Clausewitz and thought in terms of economic "national interests," they blundered into a breach of manners that offended sensibilities forged over centuries to prevent the very sort of European ethnic slaughters that Hitler was (in the minds of middle class British and American citizens) inevitably provoking.
Thus, when the British and American publics decided to fight "The Good War" they were absolutely sincere. It was inevitable not only that Hess's peace overture to Britain and similar entreaties to the U.S. to join Germany's crusade against Soviet communism would fail, but that Germany's loss of the war would plunge the West into a long winter of moralistic propaganda with constant reminders about "Holocausts" and "ultimate evils."
Give them an "A+" for engineering, but an "F" for marketing.
With Hitler out of the way, the Western press could then fall back into its comfortable pattern of seeing all conflicts as arising out of belief systems and ideologies of the "left" and "right."
Thus, in the transition piece below, the author, while coming perilously close to declaring openly what we all know to be true, reaffirms the common faith when he talks about afghanistan:
"In Afghanistan, where leftists recently scored a resounding political victory for communism, Islamic rebels are challenging that leftward swing."
Indeed, I can just picture thousands of barefoot Afghan tribesmen debating the "leftism" they learned while on their frequent summer vacations to City College of New York and Harvard!
During these same years, the Wall Street Journal faithfully described the conflict in Angola as a struggle between Savimbi's UNITA rightists and the communist MPLA. Finally, on April 14, 1993, the editor told the truth, and in a most ungentle way. The "leftists" in control were Kimbundu, while the "rightist" rebels were Ovimbundu. May not mean much to you and I, but apparently it is a matter of life and death to them.
"Mr. Savimbi spoke the values of his American supporters, while the MPLA called itself the Leninist vanguard. For the people of Angola, though, the battle was palpably one of race, ethnicity and the perquisites of control. Angola is a vast territory, and ranks near the bottom of the scale ethnologists use to measure ethnic homogeneity. Mr. Savimbi's followers, the Ovimbundu, inhabit the remote and forested provinces of south and central Angola. The Soviet sponsored MPLA was the party of Luanda's Portuguese-educated intellectuals. Though largely white or mestizo, they had their populist allies, the Kimbundu people, whose ethnic hinterland lies to the north and east of the capital. The triumph of American values abroad wasn't likely to turn these contestants into Republicans and Democrats."
So then the question becomes "what happened between 1979 and 1993?
The answer is that Europeans the world over dropped the socialist pretense that Western prosperity would prevent conflict. The Russians got tired of supporting the ethnic republics and set them free to pay their own bills.
The liberal multiculturalists in the United States and Europe abandoned the socialist pretense of assimilation and began to encourage their non-white immigrant groups toward separation and White hating.
What happened is simply this. In the first half of the 20th Century, Europeans took the habit of refusing to recognize European ethnic and tribal differences and applied it broadly to all races on earth. They tried to be "color blind."
In the second half of the 20th Century, they abandoned that conceit for some unknown reason.
Only one conclusion is certain. Euro-Americans are no longer afraid of slaughters between and among Europeans. For the social convention to disappear, the driver behind it must have disappeared. But that is all we know for sure.
Manners are a far more important and effective means of social control than police power. Arrests, fines, penalties, licenses and permits only enrage. If police and the bureaucracy are assigned responsibility for social control of a majority they have an impossible task. The majority must control itself through manners and social conventions. The bureaucracy and the police must avoid contact with those who display those manners and follow those conventions. Otherwise there will be nothing but militias and rebellions.
If the elite manages to define certain behaviors as badges of poverty and ignorance, avoidance of those behaviors will be reinforced vigorously through private action throughout all social strata.
Gentlemen, I would suggest that when a code of behavior built and followed by Europeans for 300 years is suddenly abandoned, something very important is going on.
It is not only the Wall Street Journal that openly describes combatants as being of different races, but the L.A. Times and the New York Times as well.
Let us be clear.
The liberals in charge of these papers know perfectly well that once you publicly label "race" as the prime motive behind conflict, you have just told Euro-America that race and racial defense are critical to survival.
You do not need to speak explicitly of White interests to get the point across. Any liberal who openly encourages Mecha's Aztlan and black separatism argues, by default, for a new White Nation. In their minds the new White Nation may be a slave nation, but it is a separate racial state nonetheless. As to why liberals are willing to bring race back into public awareness, I can only hazard a guess. (While I have gone to school with liberals and worked with them all my life, I have never really understood them.)
First, the information elite is lost physical and cultural contact with ordinary folks and no longer has the capacity to influence manners and social conventions through direct interaction.
Second, the elite now is half Asian and Jewish, with smaller quota-protected Black and Hispanic contingents. White gentiles are a minority within our elite, and the younger ones have lost any sense of history. Modern liberals probably no longer believe that the behavioral demands of their group will be respected by majority Whites.
Third, while the news shows make a valiant effort to instruct us on how to feel about things, television has ceased to be an effective conduit for instruction on manners.
Fourth, I suspect that the ascendancy of Japan, and its elephantine neighbor China, have rendered fear of intra- European conflicts obsolete.
Finally, just as Stalin turned on the Jews who created the Russian revolution and drove them from public life in Russia, the liberals have developed a newer, meaner form of liberalism that is rendering the blacks and browns incapable of racial competition, as a prelude to our transition into a Society based on the Latin-American model of a small White elite ruling large brown masses. Through the welfare state, the libs have found a way to render races dumb and docile without alarming them. To keep the game going, all they need is to buy off the small number of intelligent blacks and browns with quotas, and silence the "white trash" who get insecure about their unspoken place in this transition.
As we speak, the Euro-American Nation is slipping into separatism by default and not by design. We are surrounded by the chaotic consequences of a confused and weakened elite which no longer understands its most sternly obligatory behaviors. Absent effective political organization, we are slipping into an atmosphere fraught with the danger of violence and extreme repression.
If I am right about the new, meaner form of liberalism, then it is obvious that White Nationalism offers a more humane and far less expensive alternative for preventing ethnic conflict. We should follow Russia's example by giving the blacks and browns their own small nations, thereby relieving the pressure on the average White to submerge himself into that brown servile mass of the liberals' dreams.
In any event, we do not have the option of turning a blind eye to race any longer. Devolution has already begun. The liberals have started this process and they leave us no alternative but active participation to fix upon satisfactory details of implementation.
[Feb. 21, 1979 Wall Street Journal P16 C4]
The Middle East's Shi'ites Hail Khomeini
By RAY VICKER
BEIRUT, Lebanon-On Rue Hamra and adjacent streets here nearly every shop and wall carries photographs of the Ayatollah Rouhallah Khomeini, leader of the Islamic revolution in Iran.
On a recent day, several thousand demonstrators march on a street in the southern part of this city. They carry banners praising the Islamic Republic which may soon be established in Iran. The Ayatollah Khomeini's photograph is hoisted aloft by dozens of marchers as if the religious leader were the new prophet for all Islam.
It is about 850 miles from this Lebanese capital to the capital city of Tehran in Iran, but developments here show that already, with Iran's revolution not yet complete, its repercussions are already being felt elsewhere in the Middle East.
Yasser Arafat, leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization was in Iran over the past weekend cementing newly opened relations with the Islamic movement there. Here in Beirut, Palestinians speak of Iran as if it may be fighting beside Palestinians against Israel in the future. Shi'ite Moslems in this city show a new cockiness, as if they are riding the crest of victory.
Elsewhere in the Mideast there are mixed feelings about the Iranian revolution. There is pride in a victory which is seen as a definite islamic coup ( even though left-wingers in Iran may be in the background ready to seize control should Islamic leaders falter). There is also anxiety that the trouble from Iran might spill into Shi'ite minorities in other countries.
In Iraq, the ruling Baathist party wonders uneasily if its large Shi'ite population will be stimulated into troublesome political expression. The Baath leadership is currently composed largely of Sunni Moslems.
In Kuwait and other sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf, governments are keeping a closer watch upon Shi'ite minorities. For decades, Iranians have been settling in the sheikhdoms as jobs appeared. They brought there religion with them and kept separate from Sunni Moslems, always remaining outsiders.
Even Saudi Arabia has small pockets of Shi'ite Moslems in its eastern province. That happens to be where the Saudis' oil is
"The Shia have always been clannish wherever they settle," says one diplomat here. "And they have a long History of dissidence, of being opposed to whatever government happens to be in power, of being fanatical once aroused."
Here in Lebanon, Shiite Moslems are numerous. Of the country's three million or so people including Palestinians, perhaps a half million are Shias. They are outnumbered by both Christians and by Sunni Moslems. Shi'ites, however, often act as a body. They are well organized and disciplined, pressed together by a persecution complex which sometimes has had more than mere paranoia behind it.
One Shi'ite Moslem who attended the American University of Beirut bristles when told what the diplomat had to say about Shi'ite fanaticism. A businessman with a thriving fruit warehousing operation, he says: "Certainly we take our religion seriously. But we are not fanatic. We merely believe in speaking out when we encounter oppression. And we believe in defending our religion whenever it seems threatened.
He avers that the biggest threat today comes from Israel, not from brother Arab countries. He adds: "Don't misinterpret developments here, though. Right now the demonstrations you have been watching are more a sign of pride in Islam rather than an expression of newly aroused religious feeling. Maybe the arousal will come later. Now it is the same pride American blacks had when they realized they didn't have to hang their heads in shame for some imagined weakness in their character."
That may be so. However, one historian at Beirut's American University points out that Shi'ites in the past have been ready to follow those religious leaders they believe to be divinely inspired.
Iran is likely to have its hands full trying to reestablish its economy, and thus won't be knocking on Israel's door for awhile. The Ayatollah Khomeini said a few days ago that "we will turn to the issue of victory over Israel" when local problems are solved. One needs only to travel a few miles through Iran to sense that these problems are not going to be solved quickly.
Still, the Islamic upsurge being noted in different ways across the whole Moslem world does promise to create new problems, fresh opportunities and different attitudes. In Afghanistan, where leftists recently scored a resounding political victory for communism, Islamic rebels are challenging that leftward swing.
In Egypt, religion remains a powerful force despite decades of trending steadily toward secular Western ways. President Anwar Sadat had to warn Islamic leaders recently that their efforts should be kept within religious channels, not switched to political themes. Any upsurge of religious feeling in Egypt certainly could have unforeseeable consequences in that country.
Here in Lebanon, the growing political awareness of Shi'ite Moslems could have repercussions of its own. In recent years, Christians and Moslems sometimes seemed to be pulling ever further apart in this war-torn nation. Yet Shias always seemed to evade taking sides and plunging into the Lebanese blood baths.
Now they are growing more anti-Zionist, much more oriented toward the PLO and they are listening closely to the Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran.
Mr. Vicker is the Journal's senior international correspondent.
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